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1. Introduction 
Along with the competition intensity globally, quality management activities should go 
across the firms’ boundaries and be pursued in supply chain environment (Flynn and Flynn 
2005; Kaynak and Hartley 2008; Schweinberg 2009; Yeung 2008). Supply chain quality 
management (SCQM) is the interdisciplinary field between Quality Management (QM) and 
Supply Chain Management (SCM). SCQM is different from the traditional QM methods 
such as Statistical Quality Control (SQC), Total Quality Management (TQM) and Quality 
Management Systems (QMSs), which focus on the implementation of QM in single firm 
environment. Since one of the QM activities’ characteristics in supply chain situation is that 
each member makes its QM decisions independently, SCQM is the formal coordination and 
integration of business processes involving all partner organizations in order to create value 
and achieve satisfaction of intermediate and final customers (Foster 2008; Kaynak and 
Hartley 2008; Robinson and Malhotra 2005). SCQM emphasizes the coordination of all 
members’ QM activities which are driven by all members’ self-interests. In short, SCQM is 
the effective integration of firms’ internal QM activities.  
There are many coordination mechanisms to carry out SCQM such as supply chain 
contracts, information technology, information sharing, and joint decision-making (Corbett 
et al. 2004; Lee et al. 1997; Robinson and Malhotra 2005). In this chapter we focus on the 
method of contract design since the implementation of supply chain contracts have the 
advantages of small cost and convenient operations. It is known that the process of contract 
design should pay significant attention to all members’ self-interest QM activities and the 
various supply chain environments. Fortunately, game theory is the natural tool to 
investigate contract design in various situations of SCQM.  
We study contract design for SCQM about behavior observability and external failure 
sharing in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain. In manufacturing supply chains, 
members’ behavior observability and influencing factors to cost sharing of external failure 
are two main aspects to influence SCQM implementation (Arshinder et al. 2008; Malchi 
2003; Reyniers and Tapiero 1995a, b; Sower 2004). The influencing factors to external failure 
sharing include the verifiability of external failure, the separability of final product 
architecture, and the member’s relationship (Baiman et al. 2000, 2001; Balachandran and 
Radhakrishnan 2005; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995; Sila et al. 2006). If some behavior 
of one member is unobservable to other parties, the member will use this condition as a 
strategic weapon to improve its own profit. The result of this case may damage other parties 
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as well as the whole supply chain’s profit. On the other hand, external failure sharing has 
directly impact on supply chain’s risk sharing. The occurrence of external failure will cause 
lots of extra cost to the buyers. This kind of cost should be shared by all the members 
involved in a supply chain. Otherwise, the supply chain is not coordinated and the 
competitive advantage is ruined. 
In this chapter, we employ contract design to pursue SCQM implementation in a 
manufacturing supply chain. A supplier sells intermediate products to a manufacturer, and 
the manufacturer inspects the products and processes the “qualified” to be final product. 
The supplier’s production behavior is unobservable to the manufacturer. The analysis is in 
the view of the manufacturer (the buyer of the supply chain). An external failure sharing 
mechanism is employed to presents the three influencing factors to external failure sharing 
which are interactive. Then the circumstance of the supply chain is determined by the 
observabilities of the manufacturer’s inspection and processing, the verifiability of external 
failure sharing, the separability of final product architecture, and the relationship of two 
parties. The contracts are designed to guarantee SCQM in different circumstances. The 
objective of SCQM is to achieve supply chain coordination in this chapter.  
The analysis is taken into two steps. In the first step, the first-best achievement is examined 
in four circumstances characterized only by the observabilities of the manufacturer’s 
inspection and processing. In the second step, contracts for supply chain coordination are 
designed in circumstances characterized by all of the observability of the manufacturer’s 
inspection and processing and the three influencing factors of external failure sharing. 
Thirty-two circumstances are divided into two groups based on the two parties’ relationship 
whether the two parties are friends. In this case, the interactions of the three factors of 
external failure sharing can be illustrated as a tree structure.  
Here are the main findings. In the first step, necessary and sufficient conditions in which the 
first-best solution can be attained are derived in each of the four circumstances. Moreover, it 
is shown that the observability of the manufacturer’s inspection and processing can be 
investigated separately in the examination of first-best achievement. The unobservable of 
the manufacturer’s inspection is corresponding with the conditions (1) the supplier is not 
responsible for the external failure caused by the manufacturer’s defect, and (2) the 
supplier’s product price and the proportion of customer dissatisfaction that the supplier is 
responsible for satisfy / /(1 )ds s     ( d  is customer satisfaction cost and s  is the 
proportion in which the supplier is responsible for the external failure caused by its own 
defect). The unobservable of the manufacturer’s processing is corresponding with the 
condition that the final product architecture is separable-but-not-totally. 
In the second step, it is concluded that there are five kinds of contracts which guarantee the 
first-best achievement in the thirty-two circumstances. When the two parties are friends, 
there are ten circumstances in which contracts are needed to guarantee the first-best 
achievement; and when the two parties are not friends, there are eight circumstances in 
which contracts are needed. The relation between circumstances and corresponding 
contracts is not a one-to-one mapping. Moreover, some contracts are robust to some 
characteristics of the circumstances. For example, the contract that the manufacturer’s 
inspection quality level is stipulated to the corresponding first-best is robust to the 
verifiability of external failure, the separability of final product architecture, and the 
relationship of two parties. Meanwhile, the above contract is a panacea to the eight 
circumstances in which the first-best solution cannot be achieved without extra contracts 
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when the two parties are not friends. Furthermore, it is shown whether the first-best can be 
attained based upon the manufacturer’s inspection or processing information system 
installation and how contracts are designed to guarantee the first-best achievement in case 
that the first-best solution cannot be achieved when some installation is established. Besides, 
we make a comparison between the results in the literature and in this chapter.  
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review. Section 3 is model 
description. Section 4 is first-best examination of the manufacturer’s unobservable 
inspection and processing. Section 5 is contract design for first-best achievement in 
circumstances characterized by the manufacturer’s behavior observability and the three 
influencing factors of external failure sharing. The last section is the concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review 
Competition has extended from firm level to supply chain level. The focus of QM is being 
transferred to external QM, which is referred to SCQM (Foster 2008; Haynak and Haytley 
2008; Liker and Choi 2004). SCQM emphasizes the coordination and integration of each 
party’s businesses to increase the whole supply chain’s profit as well as each member’s 
profit (Robinson and Malhotra 2005). However, the coordination of SCQM will not be 
derived naturally. Buyer’s unobservable behaviors and external failure sharing are two 
aspects which significantly influence the coordination in manufacturing supply chains 
(Baiman et al. 2000, 2001; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005; Hwang et al. 2006; 
Reyniers and Tapiero 1995a, b; Swinney and Netessine 2009). 
The observabilities of a buyer’s inspection and processing behaviors have been investigated 
in two kinds of supply chains. Firstly, Reyniers and Tapiero (1995a, b) consider the 
unobservable of a buyer’s inspection, but the buyer does not process the “qualified” product 
further. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995b) give the conditions for the first-best achievement. 
Secondly, Baiman et al. (2000, 2001), Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Hwang 
(2006) consider supply chain in which a buyer inspects a supplier’s product and further 
processes the inspection-qualified product to be final product. These papers only involve the 
unobservable of the buyer’s processing but not the unobservable of the buyer’s inspection. 
Baiman et al. (2000, 2001) give the conditions for the first-best achievement when a supplier 
has the sole authority in contract design, and Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) and 
Hwang (2006) give the contract design for the first-best achievement when a buyer has the 
sole authority. However, the unobservable of a buyer’s inspection has not been studied in 
the case that the buyer processes inspection-qualified product further. On the other hand, 
the relation between the observabilities of a buyer’s inspection and processing has not been 
investigated in contract design. Maybe there are some interactions between them. In 
addition, the behavior observability in contract design should be considered in various 
supply chain environments.  
The external failure sharing is influenced by three interactive factors, which are the 
verifiability of external failure, the separability of final product architecture and the 
relationship of two parties. In literatures, the three factors are investigated separately. The 
external failure of a buyer has been studied by modeling in Baiman et al. (2000). In the event 
of external failure, if the external failure is verifiable, the penalty paid by a supplier to a 
buyer is based on the external failure caused by the supplier’s defect; otherwise, the penalty 
is based on all external failure. The separability of final product architecture has been 
investigated by modeling in Baiman et al. (2001). If final product architecture is totally-
www.intechopen.com
 
Supply Chain Management – Pathways for Research and Practice 
 
60
separable (i.e. the product architecture is modular), the supplier will be responsible for the 
external failure caused by the supplier; if final product architecture is non-separable (i.e. the 
product architecture is integrated), the supplier will not be responsible for the external 
failure (Baiman et al. 2001; Ulrich 1995). Although discussed separately, it is known that the 
verifiability of external failure and the separability of final product architecture are 
connected in the proportion of external failure that a supplier is responsible for. 
Furthermore, the relationship of the two parties of supply chain, which has not been 
discussed in quality-based supply chain, also connects with the proportion of external 
failure that a supplier is responsible for. In addition, the above three characteristics of 
supply chain environment are interacted in contract design. For example, the consideration 
of the three characteristics has priority, i.e. the contractibility of external failure should be 
considered firstly. Because the separability of final product architecture and the relationship 
of the two parties will not influence the proportion of external failure that the supplier is 
responsible for if the external failure is unverifiable. In this chapter, an external failure-
sharing mechanism is employed to connect the three influencing factors and the interactions 
among the three factors are taken serious in contract design.  
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the observability and the contractibility are 
different (Tirole 1999). In economic literature, the contractibility is considered as two levels, 
i.e. observability and verifiability (Tirole 1999; Maskin and Tirole 1999). Since a contractible 
event must be verified and enforced by a court, an uncontractible event may be observable 
but not verifiable. However, in the literature of contract design in quality-based supply 
chain, the unobservable and the uncontractible are always assumed to be the same (Reyniers 
and Tapiero 1995a, b; Baiman et al. 2000, 2001; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005; 
Hwang 2006). In this chapter, the observability and verifiability are considered separately if 
the contractibility is involved. Since the event of external failure is common and observable 
in the buyer’s after-sale of supply chain, the uncontractible of external failure is due to 
unverifiable. So we take this uncontractible event as “unverifiable”. 
3. Model description 
We consider a supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral manufacturer. 
The supplier provides one unit product for the manufacturer. The supplier’s production 
quality level Sq  is the probability that the production fulfills or exceeds the expectation of 
final customers ( 0[ ,1)S Sq q  and 0 0Sq  ), and the supplier’s investment ( )SS q  satisfies 
(1)S   , ( ) 0SS q  , and ( ) 0SS q  . The manufacturer will inspect the product once it is 
received. If the product is defective, the manufacturer can inspect to be “unqualified” with 
probability  ( 1[0, ]   and 1 1  ), and the inspection cost ( )I   satisfies (1)I   , 
( ) 0I   , and ( ) 0I   . The inspection-unqualified product will be delivered back to the 
supplier. Otherwise, the manufacturer will process the product into final product and sell to 
customers. The manufacturer’s processing quality level Mq  is the probability that the 
processing fulfills or exceeds the expectation of final customers ( 0[ ,1)M Mq q  and 0 0Mq  ), 
and the processing cost ( )MM q  satisfies (1)M   , ( ) 0MM q  , and ( ) 0MM q  . Since the 
manufacturer’s inspection is imprecise, the external failure will occur. The cost of external 
failure not only includes the final product price, but also customer dissatisfaction (Heagy 
1991; Ittner et al. 1999; Kumar et al. 1998; Sower 2004). The supplier is responsible for   
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percent of customer dissatisfaction cost d . In addition, supplier’s product price is  , the 
final product price is  . Without loss of generality, the price of the supplier’s raw material 
is 0  (Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005; Hwang et al. 2006).  
From the description, the probability of an external failure is (1 )(1 ) (1 )S M SE q q q     , 
where (1 )(1 )Sq    is due to the supplier’s poor production and the manufacturer’s 
incorrect inspection and (1 )M Sq q  is due to the manufacturer’s poor processing. In this 
chapter, we employ an external failure-sharing mechanism to decide the supplier’s share, 
which wholly represents the verifiabibity of external failure, the separability of the final 
product architecture, and the relationship of the two parties. Specifically, the supplier’s 
share of the external failure is (1 )(1 ) (1 )S S M SE s q m q q     , where s  ( 0 1s  ) be the 
proportion that the supplier takes the responsibility of (1 )(1 )Sq   , and m  ( 0 1m  ) be 
the proportion that the supplier takes the responsibility of (1 )M Sq q . The parameter s , 
which is related with the verifiability of external failure and the separability of the final 
product architecture, is determined by an objective judgment machine. The parameter m , 
which is related with the verifiability of external failure and the relationship of the two 
parties, is determined by the agreement of the two parties. If the external failure is 
unverifiable, the supplier will not be responsible for the external failure ( 0s   and 0m  ); 
otherwise, the supplier will be responsible for. In case that the external failure is verifiable, 
the supplier’s share of external failure depends on two factors: the final product architecture 
and the two parties’ relationship. For the parameter s , if the architecture is totally-
separable, 1s  ; if the architecture is non-separable, 0s  ; if the architecture is separable-
but-not-totally, 0 1s  . For the parameter m , if the two parties are not friends or if the 
two parties are friends and the final product architecture is totally-separable, 0m  ; if the 
two parties are friends and if the final product architecture is not-totally-separable, 
0 1m  .  
4. First-best examinations about manufacturer’s unobservable behaviors 
First of all, we give the first-best outcome. According to model description, the 
manufacturer’s profit is 
( , , , , , ) ( )[1 (1 )] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )M S M S S MP q q m q d E d E I M q                   , 
the supplier’s profit is  
( , , , , , ) [1 (1 )] ( ) ( )S S M S S SP q q m q d E S q            , 
and the whole profit of the supply chain is  
( , , , , , ) [1 (1 )] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S M S S MP q q m q d E I S q M q              . 
 
The problem of First-Best of supply chain is 
0 , , 1
( , , )
S M
S M
q q
Maximize P q q   . Suppose that 
0 0( ) ( )S Md q M q    and 0 0 0(1 ) ( )S M Sq d q S q    , there is an interior solution * * *{ , , }S Mq q   
satisfies 
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 ( ) '( ) 0
Mq S M
P d q M q     , (1) 
 (1 ) '( ) 0SP d q I     , (2) 
 ( ) '( ) 0
Sq M S
P d d q S q       . (3) 
(Referred on Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005). 
There are four circumstances characterized by the observability of the manufacturer’s 
behaviors, which depend on the observability of the inspection or the processing. The 
decision-making processes of the circumstances can be considered in two stages by game-
theoretical thinking (Rasmusen 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Wei 2001). In the first 
stage, the manufacturer makes an offer of contract to the supplier. If the supplier takes the 
offer, the processes go into the next stage in which the two parties optimize their profits by 
manipulating the variables { , , }S Mq q   respectively.  
The first-best solution can be attained if the supply chain is integrated, i.e. the optimal value 
ˆˆ ˆ{ , , }S Mq q   of decentralized supply chain is coincident with the first-best * * *{ , , }S Mq q  . 
Circumstance 1 The manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both unobservable to the 
supplier. In the second stage, the manufacturer decides the inspection level   and the 
processing quality level Mq , and the supplier decides the production quality level Sq  
simultaneously and independently. Therefore, the manufacturer’s optimization problem is 
 
0 , , 1; , 0
( , , , , )
S M
M
S M
q q
Maximize P q q         (A) 
subject to 
       ( , , , , ) 0
M
M
q S MP q q     ,  (B) 
 ( , , , , ) 0M S MP q q     , (C) 
 ( , , , , ) 0
S
S
q S MP q q     ,  (D) 
 ( , , , , )S S MP q q v    .  (E) 
Equations (B) and (C) are incentive-compatible constraints since the supplier does not 
observe the manufacturer’s Mq  and  . Equation (D) is an incentive-compatible constraint 
since the manufacturer does not observe the supplier’s Sq . Equation (E) is a participation 
constraint ensuring a minimum profit v  for the supplier. We have the following result. (All 
proofs are provided in the appendix.) 
Proposition 1 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
unobservable to the supplier. The first-best solution can be attained if and only if (a) the 
supplier is not responsible for the manufacturer’s external failure caused by the 
manufacturer’s defect i.e. 0m  ; (b) the final product architecture is separable-but-not-
totally, i.e. 0 1s  ; and (c) the supplier’s product price and the proportion of customer 
dissatisfaction the supplier is responsible for satisfy / /(1 )ds s    .  
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The conditions (a) and (c) can be achieved by contract design, while the condition (b) is 
objective one of supply chain. Based on condition (a), the manufacturer should not make the 
supplier hold responsible for the external failure caused by the supplier’s own defect. Based 
on condition (c), the manufacturer should not fiercely reduce the supplier’s product price, 
which will damage the total interest of supply chain. Specifically, (1) the more the 
Proposition of customer dissatisfaction the supplier is responsible for, (2) the more customer 
dissatisfaction, or (3) the more the final product’s architecture is separable, the higher the 
supplier’s product price.  
Circumstance 2  The manufacturer’s inspection is unobservable to the supplier while the 
processing is observable. The second stage is divided into two steps: firstly, the 
manufacturer decides the processing quality level Mq  which the supplier observes; 
secondly, the manufacturer and the supplier simultaneously move to decide the inspection 
level   and the production quality level Sq . Therefore the manufacturer’s optimization 
problem is  
 
0 , , 1; , 0
( , , , , )
S M
M
S M
q q
Maximize P q q          (A) 
subject to 
 ( , , , , ) 0M S MP q q     , (C) 
 ( , , , , ) 0
S
S
q S MP q q     , (D) 
 ( , , , , )S S MP q q v    . (E) 
Note that the incentive-compatible constraint (B) is not included in contrast to Circumstance 
1, which is because the supplier will utilize the decision about Mq  to maximize its profit. 
The following Proposition holds.  
Proposition 2 Suppose that the manufacturer’s processing is observable to the supplier 
while the inspection is unobservable. The first-best solution can be attained if and only if (b) 
the final product architecture is separable-but-not-totally, i.e. 0 1s  ; and (c) the supplier’s 
product price and the proportion of customer dissatisfaction the supplier is responsible for 
satisfy / /(1 )ds s    . 
According to Proposition 1 and 2, we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 1 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
unobservable to the supplier. The first-best solution can be attained if (b) the final product 
architecture is separable-but-not-totally, i.e. 0 1s  ; (c) the supplier’s product price and 
the proportion of customer dissatisfaction the supplier is responsible for satisfy 
/ /(1 )ds s    ; and (d) the manufacturer’s processing quality level Mq  is stipulated to 
be the first-best *Mq  in the contract.  
Circumstance 3 The manufacturer’s inspection is observable to the supplier while the 
processing is unobservable. The second stage is: firstly, the manufacturer decides the 
inspection level  which the supplier observes; secondly, the manufacturer and the supplier 
decide the processing quality level Mq  and the production quality level Sq  simultaneously 
and independently. Therefore, the manufacturer’s optimization problem is  
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0 , , 1; , 0
( , , , , )
S M
M
S M
q q
Maximize P q q          (A) 
subject to 
  ( , , , , ) 0
M
M
q S MP q q     , (B) 
 ( , , , , ) 0
S
S
q S MP q q     , (D) 
 ( , , , , )S S MP q q v    . (E) 
Note that the incentive-compatible constraint (C) is not included in contrast to 
CIRCUMSTANCE 1 and the argument is similar to the one in CIRCUMSTANCE 2. The first-
best achievement in Circumstance 3 is characterized by the following Proposition. 
(Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) derives the same result when 0 1s  .) 
Proposition 3 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection is observable to the supplier 
while the processing is unobservable. The first-best solution can be attained if and only if (a) 
the supplier is not responsible for the manufacturer’s external failure caused by the 
manufacturer’s defect, i.e. 0m  . 
According to Proposition 1 and 3 we have 
Corollary 2 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
unobservable to the supplier. The first-best solution can be attained if (a) the supplier is not 
responsible for the manufacturer’s external failure caused by the manufacturer’s defect, i.e. 
0m  ; and (e) the manufacturer’s inspection quality Sq  is stipulated to be  the first-best *  
in the contract. 
Circumstance 4  The manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both observable to the 
supplier. The second stage is: firstly, the manufacturer decides the inspection level   and 
processing quality level Mq , which the supplier observes; secondly, the supplier decides the 
production quality level Sq . Therefore the manufacturer’s optimization problem is  
 
0 , , 1; , 0
( , , , , )
S M
M
S M
q q
Maximize P q q          (A) 
subject to 
   ( , , , , ) 0
S
S
q S MP q q     , (D) 
 ( , , , , )S S MP q q v    . (E) 
Note that the two incentive-compatible constraints (B) and (C) are not included in contrast 
to Circumstance 1. We have the following Proposition. (Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 
(2005) derives the same result when 0 1s  .) 
Proposition 4 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
observable to the supplier. The first-best solution can be attained without extra condition. 
From Proposition 1, 2, 3, and 4, we have 
Corollary 3 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
unobservable to the supplier. The first-best solution can be attained if (d) the manufacturer’s 
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processing quality level Mq  is stipulated to be the first-best 
*
Mq , and (e) the manufacturer’s 
inspection quality level   is stipulated to be the first-best *  in the contract. 
Corollary 4  Suppose that the manufacturer’s processing is observable to the supplier while 
her inspection is unobservable. The first-best solution can be attained if (e) the 
manufacturer’s inspection quality level   is stipulated to be the first-best *  in the contract. 
Corollary 5   Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection is observable to the supplier while 
her processing is unobservable. The first-best solution can be attained if (d) the 
manufacturer’s processing quality level Mq  is stipulated to be the first-best 
*
Mq  in the 
contract. 
From Proposition 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is found that the observability of the manufacturer’s 
inspection and processing can be investigated separately. Specifically, we have the following 
observation. 
Observation 1   The observabilities of the manufacturer’s inspection and processing can be 
investigated separately in analyses of the first-best achievement. If the manufacturer’s 
processing is unobservable, the condition (b) should be considered in contract design, if 
necessary. If the manufacturer’s inspection is unobservable, the conditions (a) and (c) should 
be considered in contract design, if necessary.  
5. Contract design in circumstances characterized by influencing factors 
In this section, contract design is pursued in circumstances characterized by the 
combinations of the manufacturer’s behavior (including inspection and processing) 
observability and the three influencing factors of external failure sharing, i.e., the 
verifiability of the manufacturer’s external failure, the separability of the final product 
architecture, and the relationship of the two parties.  
Before contract design, some issues should be illustrated. Firstly, the verifiability of external 
failure should be considered prior to the separablility of the final product architecture and 
the relationship of the two parties. Only if the external failure is verifiable, the other two 
factors will be taken into account. Secondly, the separablility of the final product 
architecture and the relationship of the two parties are interactive and do not have priority. 
Thirdly, the observabilities of the manufacturer’s behaviors are independent of the three 
characteristics of supply chain environment. Fourthly, from Observation 1, the 
observabilities of the inspection and the processing are separable in supply chain quality 
management.  
We divide the circumstances into two groups to discuss: friends or not-friends. In each 
group, there are four factors influencing contract design, i.e. the observability of the 
manufacturer’s inspection, the observability of the manufacturer’s processing, the 
verifiability of the external failure, and the separability of the final product architecture. It is 
important that there are only two relations between the four factors – independent and 
hierarchical. In this case, the braches of the four factors are depicted in Figure 1. The 
manufacturer’s inspection has two nodes: NOMI  (unobservable) and OMI  (observable). The 
manufacturer’s processing has two nodes: NOMP  (unobservable) and OMP  (observable). The 
combination of the verifiability of the manufacturer’s external failure and the separability of 
the final product architecture has three end-nodes: V T NME A   (the manufacturer’s 
external failure is verifiable and the final product architecture is totally separable or non-
separable, i.e. 1s   or 0s  ), V S TME A   (the manufacturer’s external failure is verifiable 
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and the final product architecture is separable-but-not-totally, i.e. 0 1s  ) and NVME  (the 
manufacturer’s external failure is unverifiable, i.e. 0SE  ).   
 
Manufacturer’s External Failure
Final Product Architecture
Verifiable Unverifiable
Non-
Separable
Separable 
but 
Not Totally
N
V
ME
TSV
AME NV AME 
Manufacturer’s Inspection
Unobservable Observable
O
MIN
O
MI
Manufacturer’s Processing
Unobservable Observable
O
MP
N
O
MP
(1)
(2) (3)
TV
AME 
Totally 
Separable
 
Fig. 1. The branches of the observability of the manufacturer’s inspection, the observability 
of the manufacturer’s processing, the verifiability of external failure, and the separability of 
the final product architecture 
There are sixteen different circumstances characterized by the combinations of end-notes in 
Figure 1. According to Proposition 1-4 and Corollary 1-4, contracts by stipulating which the 
first-best solution is achieved in different circumstances are exhibited in Table 1. The items 
of contracts are: 
1. The external failure which is caused by the manufacturer’s defect but the supplier is 
responsible for is zero, i.e. 0m  .  
2. The supplier’s product price and the proportion of customer dissatisfaction the supplier 
is responsible for satisfy / /(1 )ds s    .  
3. The manufacturer’s inspection quality level  is the first-best * .  
4. The manufacturer’s processing quality level Mq is the first-best 
*
Mq .  
For example, if the supply chain in Circumstance 1 of Table 1, Contract [2+4] guarantees 
first-best achievement according to Proposition 1. Note that the contracts listed in Table 1 
are the ones which encompass the least items. Otherwise there are much more satisfied 
contracts. For instance, Contract [3+4] is suitable for every circumstance according to 
Proposition 4.  
There are five kinds of contracts, i.e. contracts [2], [3], [4], [2+4] and [3+4], to guarantee first-
best achievement. When the two parties are friends, there are ten circumstances in which 
first-best solution is achieved by extra contracts; and when the two parties are not friends, 
there are eight circumstances. The relation of the circumstances and the contracts is not a 
one-to-one mapping. When the two parties are friends, the reasons that the first-best can be 
attained without contract in the other four circumstances are (a) the manufacturer’s 
inspection is observable to the supplier, the external failure is verifiable, and the final 
product architecture is totally separable (Circumstances 11 and 15); (b) the manufacturer’s 
inspection is observable and the manufacturer’s external failure is unverifiable 
(Circumstance 12 and 16); or (c) the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
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CIRCUMSTANCES CONTRACTS 
Friends Not-Friends 
1. N
O
MI  NOMP  VME  NA  [3+4] [3] 
2. N
O
MI  NOMP  VME  S TA   [2+4], [3+4] [2], [3] 
3. N
O
MI  NOMP  VME  TA  [3] [3] 
4. N
O
MI  NOMP  NVME  [3] [3] 
5. N
O
MI  OMP  VME  NA [3] [3] 
6. N
O
MI  OMP  VME  S TA  [2], [3] [2], [3] 
7. N
O
MI  OMP  VME  TA [3] [3] 
8. N
O
MI  OMP  NVME  [3] [3] 
9. OMI  NOMP  VME  NA  [4] — 
10. OMI  NOMP  VME  S TA   [4] — 
11. OMI  NOMP  VME  TA  — — 
12. OMI  NOMP  NVME  — — 
13. OMI  OMP  VME  NA — — 
14. OMI  OMP  VME  S TA  — — 
15. OMI  OMP  VME  TA — — 
16. OMI  OMP  NVME  — — 
Table 1. The circumstances and the corresponding contracts when the two parties are friends 
or not friends 
observable to the supplier (Circumstance 13-15). When the two parties are not friends, there 
is only one reason to guarantee first-best achievement without contract. The reason is that 
the manufacturer’s inspection is observable to the supplier.  
Some contracts are robust to the changes of some of three circumstance characteristics. 
When the two parties are friends, Contract [3+4] is robust to the separability of the final 
product architecture in circumstances that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are 
both unobservable to the supplier and the final product architecture is not totally separable 
(Circumstance 1 and 2); Contract [3] is robust to the verifiability of the manufacturer’s 
external failure and the separability of the final product architecture in circumstances that 
only the manufacturer’s inspection is unobservable to the supplier (Circumstance 4-8); 
Contract [3] is robust between the verifiable external failure and totally separable final 
product architecture (Circumstance 3) and the unverifiable external failure (Circumstance 3); 
and Contract [4] is robust between the nonseparable and separable-but-not-totally final 
product architectures in circumstances that only the manufacturer’s inspection is observable 
to the supplier and the external failure is verifiable (Circumstance 9 and 10). When the two 
parties are not friends, contract [3] is robust to the observability of the processing, the 
verifiability of the external failure, and the separability of the final product architecture in 
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circumstances except the ones that The first-best can be attained without contract. Contract 
[3] is used much more times than other contracts. When the two parties are not friends 
Contract [3] is a panacea to achieve the first-best solution. meanwhile, contract [3] is robust 
to the verifiability of external failure, the separability of the final product architecture, and 
the relationship of the two parties in circumstances that only the inspection is unobservable, 
and robust between between the verifiable external failure and totally separable final 
product architecture and the unverifiable external failure and between the friend and not-
friend relations in circumstances that the inspection and processing are both unobservable. 
Compared with the group in which the two parties are friends, there are several changes in 
groups that the two parties are not friends. Circumstances 9 and 10 guarantee first-best 
achievement without contracts. Meanwhile, it is plausible that the difference between the 
two groups is that item [4] is not included in the contract when the two parties are not 
friends in the same circumstances (Circumstances 1, 2, 9, and 10). However, that the item [4] 
is stipulated in the contract is not directly related with the situation that the two parties are 
friends. The reason of this phenomenon is: when the two parties are not friends ( 0m  ) the 
first-best can be attained by contract [1+2] (Circumstance 2), contract [1+3] (Circumstances 
1), and contract [1] (Circumstance 9 and 10), and the circumstances 1, 2, 9, and 10 all 
guarantee item [1].  
5.1 Information system installation 
IT and supply chain contracts are two key approaches to supply chain management 
(Arshinder et al. 2008; Li and Wang 2007; Saraf et al. 2007). The derived results can give 
further comments on information system installation in supply chain. The circumstances 
that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both unobservable to the supplier are 
always the original type of supply chains. The firms should make tradeoffs between 
information system installation and contract design to implement supply chain 
management. The circumstances that the inspection or the processing is observable refer to 
the situations that one of the information systems is installed. In Table 1, if the 
manufacturer’s inspection and processing systems are both installed in the supply chain, the 
first-best solution can be attained without contract; otherwise, the first-best solution cannot 
be attain without contract. To conclude, we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 5 Suppose that the manufacturer’s inspection and processing are both 
unobservable to the supplier. If installing an inspection information system in circumstances 
that the two parties are friends, The first-best can be attained without contract when the 
external failure is unverifiable or when the external failure is verifiable and the final product 
architecture is totally separable; contract [4] is needed to guarantee the first-best 
achievement when the external failure is verifiable and the final product architecture is not 
totally separable. If installing an inspection information system in circumstances that the 
two parties are not friends, supply chain can be achieved without contract in any 
circumstance. If installing a processing information system, supply chain can be achieved by 
contract [3] in any circumstance and by contract [2] only in circumstance [6].  
Therefore, information system installation should be accomplished by contract design, and 
the managers of supply chain management should pay more attention to relation between 
information technology and SC coordination. Otherwise, the objective of information system 
installation will not be achieved and the firm’s enthusiasm will be turned down.  
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5.2 Result comparison with other studies 
In the following, we make a specific comparison with the result in Baiman et al. (2000, 2001), 
which also involve the observability of the buyer’s inspection, the verifiability of external 
failure, and the separability of the final product architecture separately.  
When the manufacturer’s processing is observable and the external failure is verifiable, 
Baiman et al. (2000) show that the first-best solution is achieved (Proposition 2a); however, 
Table 1 shows that the first-best solution is achieved with extra contracts if the 
manufacturer’s inspection is unobservable (Circumstances 5-7) or without extra contract if 
the inspection is observable (Circumstances 13-15).  
When the manufacturer’s processing is unobservable, the manufacturer’s inspection is 
observable, and external failure is verifiable, Proposition 3 in Baiman et al. (2000) and 
Proposition 4 in Baiman et al. (2001) show that the first-best solution is achieved; however, 
Table 1 shows that the first-best solution is achieved without extra contract if the two parties 
are not friends (Circumstances 9-16 in Not-Friends group) or if the two parties are friends 
and the final product architecture is totally-separable (Circumstance 11 in Friends Group), 
or with extra contract if the two parties are friends and the final product architecture is not-
totally-separable (Circumstances 9 and 10 in Friends group).  
When the final product architecture is non-separable, Proposition in Baiman et al. (2001) 
shows that the first-best solution cannot be achieved, but Table 1 shows that the first-best 
solution can be attained without extra contract if the manufacturer’s inspection is observable 
and with extra contract if the inspection is unobservable.  
It is worthwhile to note that the above comparisons are just arguments by modeling 
approaches to SCC. The results are based on different assumptions of the quality-based 
supply chain.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Contract design for SCQM is discussed in a manufacturing supply chain. It is shown that 
supplier and manufacturer in some circumstances must stipulate some items in contract to 
guarantee coordination in SCQM, while other circumstances guarantee coordination 
without extra contract. Furthermore, information system installation is an alternative 
approach to coordination in those circumstances that need extra contracts to guarantee 
coordination. The exact information system should be chosen based on characteristics of the 
circumstances.  
Two issues are highlighted in the manufacturing supply chain. The observability of the 
buyer’s inspection is highlighted in supply chains such that the buyer further processes the 
supplier’s product to be final product. The result is different from the case that the buyer 
does not further process the supplier’s product. If the buyer’s inspection is unobservable, 
the supplier will be exposed to moral hazard. Moreover, the extra conditions in which the 
first-best solution is achieved are different from the ones in supply chains such that the 
buyer does not process the supplier’s product further. In this chapter, the situation that the 
manufacturer’s inspection is unobservable is corresponding with two extra conditions: (1) 
the supplier is not responsible for the external failure caused by the manufacturer’s defect, 
and (2) the supplier’s product price and the proportion of customer dissatisfaction the 
supplier is responsible for satisfy / /(1 )ds s    .  
The interactions between the external failure’s verifiability, the final product architecture’s 
separability, and the two parties’ relationship are also highlighted. The three factors do not 
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independently influence the contract design. Only if the external failure is verifiable, the 
other two factors will be taken into account. The final product architecture’s separability and 
the two parties’ relationship have the same hierarchy and have interactive influences. In this 
chapter, an external failure-sharing mechanism is employed to connect the three factors. 
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8. Appendix 
This Proof of Proposition 1: It is only to prove that the solution of maximization problem 
coincides with the first-best solution if and only if the conditions are satisfied in the 
circumstance. 
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Circumstance 1 of Section 4 is 
1 2 3 ( )M S
M M M S S
q qL P P P P P v          with 1 , 2 , 3  and   as Lagrange multipliers 
on constraints (B), (C), (D), and (E). The first-order conditions of the Lagrangian are 
1 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Mq S S M M SL d q d mq M q M q m d mq d                     ,  (A1) 
 2 3[ (1 ) (1 )](1 ) ( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ][ ( )] 0S SL s d s q I I q s d                        ,  (A2) 
1
2 3
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ (1 ) (1 )] [ ( )]
[ (1 ) (1 )] ( ) { ( )[ (1 ) (1 )] ( )} 0
Sq M M
S M S
L d q d m q s d m d
s d s S q d s m q S q
        
        
                
              , (A3) 
 3 3
1 2
[( 1)(1 ) ](1 )(1 ) [( 1) ][1 (1 )]
(1 )(1 ) 0
S S M
S S
L q s q m q
mq s q
     
 
          
       (A4)  
 3 3 1 2[( 1)(1 ) ] (1 ) [( 1) ] (1 ) (1 ) 0S S M S SL q s q m q mq s q                    .  (A5) 
Let ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , , }M Sq q     be the solution of the maximization problem.  
On the one hand, if the first-best solution is achieved, ˆSq , ˆMq  and ˆ  must satisfy (B0), (C0), 
and (D0). Comparing (B), (C) with (B0), (C0), we have ( )d s     and ( ) 0m d   . 
Since 0  , then 0m  , 0 1s  , and / /(1 )ds s    .  
On the other hand, the only thing we have to prove is that if 0m  , 0 1s  , and 
/ /(1 )ds s     then 1 2 3, , 0    and 1  . Because if 1 2 3, , 0    and 1   exist 
L P v   and the first-best solution is derived. Firstly Plugging 0m   into (A1) and 
comparing with (B) we have 1 0   since ( ) 0MM q  , and plugging / /(1 )ds s     into 
(A2) and comparing with (C), we have 2 0   since ( ) 0I   . Secondly, plugging (D), (D0), 
and 1 2, 0    into (A3) we have 3 0   since ( ) 0SS q  . Finally, plugging 0m    
and 1 2 3, , 0     into (A4) we have 1   since 0 1s  . At this moment, (A3) is also 
satisfied. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Circumstance 2 of 
Subsection 4.1 is 2 3 ( )S
M M S S
qL P P P P v        with 2 , 3 , and   as Lagrange 
multipliers on constraints (C), (D), and (E). The first-order conditions of the Lagrangian are 
 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Mq S S M SL d q d mq M q m d mq d                  ,   (A6) 
 2 3[ (1 ) (1 )](1 ) ( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ][ ( )] 0S SL s d s q I I q s d                        ,  (A7) 
 
2
3
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ (1 ) (1 )] [ (1 ) (1 )]
( ) { ( )[ (1 ) (1 )] ( )} 0,
Sq M M
S M S
L d q d m q s s d s
S q d s m q S q
         
     
              
          (A8) 
3 3 2[( 1)(1 ) ](1 )(1 ) [( 1) ][1 (1 )] (1 )(1 ) 0S S M SL q s q m q s q                      (A9) 
 3 3 2[( 1)(1 ) ] (1 ) [( 1) ] (1 ) (1 ) 0S S M SL q s q m q s q                  .  (A10) 
Let ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , , }M Sq q     be the solution of the maximization problem. 
We only prove that if 0 1s   and / /(1 )ds s     then 2 3, 0   and 1  . Firstly, 
plugging / /(1 )ds s     into (A7) and comparing with (C) we have 2 0  . Secondly, 
plugging (D), (D0) and 2 0   into (A8) we have 3 0  . Finally, plugging 2 3, 0     
into (A9) and (A10) we have ( 1)(1 )(1 )(1 ) ( 1) [1 (1 )] 0S S Mq s q m q             
and ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) 0S S Mq s q m q         . The two equations imply 
( 1)[(1 )(1 ) ] 0S Sq q      . Then 1  , since 0 1Sq   and 1  .   
Proof of Corollary 1: The process of proof is tantamount to solve two maximization 
problems 
 *
0 , 1; , 0
( , , , , )
S
M
S M
q
Maximize P q q          (A) 
subject to 
 *( , , , , ) 0M S MP q q     , (C) 
 *( , , , , ) 0
S
S
q S MP q q     , (D) 
 *( , , , , )S S MP q q v    .  (E) 
According to the proof of Proposition 3, the solution of the above problem coincides with 
the first-best solution.  
Proof of Proposition 3: The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Circumstance 3 is 
1 3 ( )M S
M M S S
q qL P P P P v        with 1 , 3 , and   as Lagrange multipliers on 
constraints (B), (D), and (E). Let ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , , }M Sq q     be the solution of the maximization 
problem. We only prove that if 0m   then 2 3, 0   and 1  . 
Following the similar steps we have that if 0m   then 1 3, 0   . It leaves to prove that 
1  . From the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian we have 
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 ( 1)[(1 )(1 )(1 ) ] 0S SL q s q         , (A11) 
 ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) 0SL q s       .  (A12) 
If 0s   we have ( 1)[(1 )(1 ) ] 0S Sq q       from (A11), while if 1s   we have 
( 1)(1 )(1 ) 0SL q        from (A12). Hence it holds that 1  .  
Proof of Proposition 4: The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Circumstance 4 is 
3 ( )S
M S S
qL P P P v      with 3  and   as Lagrange multipliers on constraints (D) and 
(E). By following the similar track as in the proof of proposition 3 we are able to obtain 
3 0   and 1  .  
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